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I. Abstract
Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to
determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators
submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction
selection in such a way that satisfies electricity demand. Most regulators currently use an
auction selection method that minimizes total offer costs [“bid cost minimization”
(BCM)] to determine electric dispatch. However, recent literature has shown that this
method may not minimize consumer payments, and it has been shown that an alternative
selection method that directly minimizes total consumer payments [“payment cost
minimization” (PCM)] may benefit social welfare in the long term. The objective of this
project is to further investigate the long term benefit of PCM implementation and
determine whether it can provide lower costs to consumers. The two auction selection
methods are expressed as linear constraint programs and are implemented in an
optimization software package. Methodology for game theoretic bidding simulation is
developed using EMCAS, a real-time market simulator. Results of a 30-day simulation
showed that PCM reduced energy costs for consumers by 12%. However, this result will
be cross-checked in the future with two other methods of bid simulation as proposed in
this paper.

II. Introduction
The world is presently facing a bitter energy crisis of massive scale. While the total
consumption and demand for fossil fuels is rising with the growth in world population,
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our supply of fossil fuels is quickly dwindling and the price of energy is accordingly
escalating at an alarming pace. The United States Department of Energy projects that by
2012, there will be a shortage of fossil fuels, and that the shortage will have to be made
up by still “unidentified projects.”

Furthermore, by 2030, the DOE expects that

approximately half of the energy needs that would normally have been supported by
fossil fuels will have to be supplied by these unidentified projects [14].
This entails that an increase in the efficiency of energy usage will be required if we are to
meet the consumer demands for electricity.

Power engineers and scientists have

discussed various options for closing this shortage; such initiatives as investment in
renewable sources of energy and development of the power transmission grid have been
developed in the United States and are in effect [5, 12]. However, these are still very new
technologies and, while they are expected to have a significant effect in the long term,
they may not be enough to satisfy aggregate consumer demands and prevent the
imminent energy crisis.

Figure 1: The supply of fossil fuels will likely decrease steadily into the near future and a shortage is
expected to occur. Source: EIA, US Department of Energy [14].
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Meanwhile, humankind’s past two centuries of industrial development have caused
steady and severe harm to the environment. Unless air pollution is heavily restricted
throughout the world, constant emissions of carbon dioxide in developed and developing
nations are expected to raise the global temperature until gradually global warming
permanently damages coastal civilizations and other regions of the world.
The power industry is responsible for the vast consumption of fossil fuels and release of
harmful pollutants to the air [11]. Thus, the development of our electricity infrastructure
– from power generation and transmission to distribution and consumption – becomes
ever more critical.

Indeed, United States President Barack Obama highlighted the

importance of rebuffing the American power grid when in 2009 he called on the
country’s engineers and bright minds to “build a new smart grid that will save us money,
protect our power sources from blackout or attack, and deliver clean, alternative forms of
energy to every corner of our nation” [16].
This project seeks to address these issues. The overall objective of this project is the
maximization of social welfare.

However, this will be accomplished via two sub-

objectives: (1) the minimization of consumer payments for energy, and (2) the reduction
of carbon dioxide emissions by power generators. These two objectives will be tackled
through investigation and analysis of the auction selection mechanism used by American
electricity regulators.
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III. Standard Electricity Market Structure
In any region, there is a certain demand for electricity. In Connecticut, this demand is
approximately 4000 MW in the day-ahead market on a peak load day. To meet this
demand, power generators interconnected through high-voltage transmission lines
produce electricity. However, the installed capacity in a region generally exceeds the
demand. In other words, power generators can produce more energy than is demanded.
At the aggregate level, Connecticut’s generators may be able to produce up to 6000 MW
or more. Thus, regulators face the problem of having to decide which generators should
be on and which should be off in order to meet real-time energy demand [1].
To handle this issue, deregulated electricity markets in the United States use an auction
mechanism to determine the daily dispatch of generators. In this scheme, generators that
produce publicly available energy submit a bid to the regional Independent System
Operator (ISO) [7]. Connecticut generators, for instance, submit their bids to ISO New
England for review. Usually, a generator’s bid consists of its power capacity constraints
(minimum and maximum generation levels), bid price [$/MW(h)], and startup cost [$].
Once bids from each of the regional generators are collected, ISO New England conducts
an auction selection to determine the dispatch of generators so as to meet the system
demand. Simultaneously, ISOs must consider the physical constraints of the generators,
the transmission constraints of the regional power system, and any other constraints.
Further, a primary objective for ISOs is to minimize the price of energy to consumers.
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Figure 2: Overview of electricity market operation. Generators submit their bids to the regional ISO in the
day-ahead and real-time energy markets, and the subsequent auction is conducted by the ISO. The auction
results are analyzed by suppliers for bids for the next day. Simulation of this market can be used to
compare the BCM and PCM auction selection methods.

These economic issues make the auction selection process for ISOs critical to the welfare
of the society. The outcome of an auction selection directly determines the price of
electricity [1]. Also, these policy decisions have significant effects on the environment in
the long run. Therefore, it is crucial to fully investigate the auction mechanism in
electricity markets so as to determine which method of selection is the most beneficial for
society from the perspective of the consumer in the long term.
Previous studies have compared BCM and PCM [13, 21, 22]. However, this project is
novel because it compares the two auction selection methods using a continuous, holistic
bidding method with industry-standard applications to simulate the bidding process and
auction selection.

Furthermore, in previous studies, generators were restricted to
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discretized bidding so that they could submit bid prices only at certain levels [22]. This
discretization is a simplification, as in real markets, generators may set their bids at any
level on a continuous range within regulated bounds. In this study, generators will be
able to bid in this continuous range for profit maximization. This will be accomplished
by using a real-time market simulator to be described in V.
The auction selection methods will also be implemented in a linear constraint
programming application built for mathematical optimization known as CPLEX. This
integration of industry-standard computer applications allows for thorough comparison of
the two auction selection methods.

IV. BCM and PCM as Constraint Programs

The advantage of payment cost minimization over bid cost minimization can be seen
from the mathematical formulation of the two methods. The objective function for the
bid cost minimization selection method can be given as

T

I

min J = ∑∑ {C i ( p i (t ), t ) + S i (t )}

{ pi ( t )}

t =1 i =1

Equation 1: Objective function for the bid cost minimization selection method.

while that of payment cost minimization is
T

min

{ MCP ( t )},{ pi ( t )}

I

J = ∑∑ {MCP (t ) p i (t ) + S i (t )}
t =1 i =1

Equation 2: Objective function for the payment cost minimization selection method.
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where t is the index number of the auction, i is the generator index, Ci is the total cost of
unit i, Si is the startup cost of unit i, MCP is the market clearing price of the auction, and
pi is the power generated by unit i. Constraints of these selection methods generally
include system demand and any physical constraints of the generating units, including
minimum up/down times, maximum and minimum capacity, and ramp rates [7, 13].

In the objective function for bid cost minimization, total offer costs are minimized.
However, this does not minimize final consumer payments to the market; instead, it only
minimizes the total cost of all bid prices submitted to the market by generators.
Conversely, payment cost minimization directly minimizes final consumer payments by
considering the system-wide market clearing price (MCP) or transmission-constrained
locational market price (LMP) in the formulation of its objective function [1, 10, 18].
The fact that BCM fails to provide an auction selection that results in minimal consumer
payments in all cases is illustrated below. System demand and bid data is given in Table
1 for a four-generator system. Comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that implementation
of PCM results in lower payment costs than BCM implementation does.

Generator

Min. MW

Max. MW

$/MW

Startup Cost

Unit 1 Bid

0

50

10

0

Unit 2 Bid

0

40

15

0

Unit 3 Bid

0

10

80

0

Unit 4 Bid

0

50

20

2000

System Demand: 100 MW
Single Hour Auction
Table 1: Problem definition with bid data for four-generator auction.
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The four bids shown in Table 1 contain all four critical elements of a standard bid. Each
gives the unit capacity constraints that the physical generator associated with the bid must
adhere to. In this example, Units 1 and 2 have very low bid prices ($10/MW and
$15/MW respectively) and no bid startup cost. Thus, it is natural that the regulator will
select them in an auction so as to minimize consumer payments. Together, these two
units will be dispatched to produce 90 MW, consisting of the maximum 50MW capacity
of Unit 1 and the maximum 40MW capacity of Unit 2. This amount of generation covers
all of the demand but for the remaining 10MW. The regulator will have to select either
Unit 3 or 4 to satisfy this remaining portion of the demand. The difference between
BCM and PCM is illustrated in this final portion of the dispatch.
Bid Cost Minimization Results, MCP = $80

Generator

Pay as Bid

MCP

Bid Costs

Payment Costs

MW

$/MW

Unit 1

50

10

500

4000

Unit 2

40

15

600

3200

Unit 3

10

80

800

800

Unit 4

0

20

0

0

1900

8000

Total Costs
Table 2: Bid cost minimization results for the bid data of Table 1.

In Table 2, we see that, following the objective of minimizing total bid (offer) costs, the
BCM method yields $1900 worth of bid costs and $8000 worth of payment costs. BCM
selects Unit 3 to provide the remaining 10MW of demanded electricity, setting the market
clearing price (MCP) to $80. In the pay-as-bid settlement scheme, this would minimize
consumer payments since Unit 4 is not selected so its startup cost is not paid. Units 1 and
2 are paid at the rate of their bid price for their generation. But as the settlement scheme
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used by most American ISOs is to pay each unit at the rate of the MCP, the high bid price
of $80 is paid to all generators and covers all 100MW of the demand, so that the total
payment cost amounts to $80/MW x 100MW = $8000.
Payment Cost Minimization Results, MCP = $20

Generator

Pay as Bid

MCP
Payment Costs

MW

$/MW

Bid Costs

Unit 1

50

10

500

1000

Unit 2

40

15

600

800

Unit 3

0

80

0

0

Unit 4

10

20

2200

2200

3300

4000

Total Costs

Table 3: Payment cost minimization results for the bid data of Table 1.

With the PCM selection method as shown in Table 3, however, payment costs are
minimized. Here, the total bid cost is higher than it was in the case of the BCM selection
method because minimization of total bid cost is not the objective. Instead, the objective
is minimization of total consumer payment cost, so under the MCP settlement scheme,
PCM yields lower total payment costs. Here, Unit 3 is not selected because it has a very
high bid price, and the MCP would have been set to $80/MW as it was in the case of the
BCM auction. However, here, Unit 4 is selected because it has a low bid price of
$20/MW. Although this unit still sets the MCP, the total energy cost is now only
$20/MW x 100MW = $2000. Adding the startup cost for Unit 4, we obtain the total
payment cost amount of $4000. In this hypothetical example, PCM implementation
would save half of the consumer’s original payment for energy.
This example assumes that bids are given. That is, Table 1 contains the bid data, and
BCM and PCM are then applied to determine which method provides lower payment
10

costs. PCM provides lower payment costs than BCM in all examples where bid data is
given. But now, we consider the case where generators know that PCM is the selection
method used by regulators. Would generators then bid differently, and would PCM
really provide lower costs in the long term? This question is addressed in V.

V. Project Methodology
To determine whether BCM or PCM is more beneficial to consumers in the long term, a
proper method of simulating the behavior of the generators is required. The primary goal
of a generating company is profit maximization. Generators know their cost structure
and the regulatory procedures for determination of daily dispatch. They are also aware
that there are many other generators present in the market and that they are competing for
dispatch of electricity [22].

Thus, a situation of an economic game arises, where each generator seeks to maximize
profit by finding the appropriate Nash equilibrium strategy of bidding. Simulation of this
behavior is very complex, as each generator must analyze its competitors’ strategies and
determine its own best course of action. A software package released by Argonne
National Laboratory, the Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System (EMCAS), was
used to simulate this stage of the market [6]. The advantage of using EMCAS is that all
external factors concerning the market are considered in the simulation, and also that
generating companies are able to bid at any level. In previous studies, this was not
possible; in the study by Zhao et. al., bids were discretized with matrix games to find the
discrete Nash equilibrium [22]. This can result in the loss of the continuous Nash
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equilibrium. With EMCAS, however, this equilibrium strategy is not lost as bidders are
able to bid at any level. At the end of this study, though, some questions were raised
about the bid simulation process used by EMCAS and other methods were used for bid
simulation to cross-check the results derived with EMCAS.

A four-generator, four-generating company (GenCo) model was developed in EMCAS as
shown in Figure 3, and a 30-day simulation was conducted as shown in Figure 2. For this
method, one day was simulated in EMCAS, day-ahead bids for the four generators were
extracted, and auctions for PCM and BCM were executed using the CPLEX
implementations described later in this section.

Auction results were then used as

historical data input for the second day in EMCAS, and the second day’s bidding events
were subsequently determined and extracted for the auction to run in CPLEX. This cycle
was repeated for 30 days, and total consumer payments were calculated for the BCM and
PCM selection methods. Units Base 1A, 2A, and 4A had no startup cost, while Base 3A
had a startup cost of $12,000.

Figure 3: EMCAS case study power system topography. Note that there are four generators at one node
and no transmission constraints present in the model.
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A simplification made in this model is the assumption of single-block bidding. While in
the New England market, GenCos are able to bid in incremental bid blocks, single bid
blocks were used in this study to avoid an added layer of complexity. Furthermore,
transmission constraints are not considered in this model and uniform MCPs are used as
opposed to transmission congestion-based LMPs. Generator startup costs are assumed to
be fully compensated. These computational simplifications are consistent with those of
previous studies of electricity markets [7, 13, 21, 22].

To simulate the auction selection conducted by the regulating ISO marked as (1) in
Figure 2, BCM and PCM were implemented as constraint programs with CPLEX, an
industry-standard linear optimization package released by IBM. The key to this step was
to first formulate the BCM and PCM constraint programs linearly. Subsequently, these
linear formulations were implemented with data used from the EMCAS bid simulations.
For illustration and reference, the specifications for the constraint programs for both
auction selection methods appear in the appendix.

VI. Simulation Results with EMCAS and CPLEX
Results from the simulation using EMCAS for bid generation and CPLEX for auction
selection show that the PCM auction method for bid selection provides lower consumer
payments than that of BCM. Results are provided in Tables 4 and 5.
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Base 1A

50

0

Average Bid Price
[30-day sim] ($/MW)
18.34

Base 2A

40

0

35.06

Base 3A

50

0

46.59

Base 4A

60

12,000

23.53

Unit ID

Capacity (MW)

Startup Cost ($)

Table 4: Example case study, generator characteristics and bid results

Objective Cost

BCM ($)

Total (First Seven Days)
Total (All 30 Days)

PCM ($)

Difference ($)

752,352

536,948

215,404

2,864,344

2,522,565

341,779

Table 5: Example case study, objective payment results

While these results seemingly show that the PCM auction mechanism is preferable from
the perspective of consumers as it yields lower final payments, this is not entirely clear.
Further inspection of the full data results suggest that, though the BCM-PCM payment
gap is high early in the early days of the simulation, in the last week, the gap is very
small or zero.

This result raises some issue with regard to the reality of the bid

generation method employed by suppliers in EMCAS.

VII. Results Discussion and Future Testing

Discrete game theoretic approach

In light of the results from the 30-day simulation with EMCAS for the simulation of bids,
it is desirable to cross-check the effectiveness of the PCM auction mechanism by using
other methods of bid generation. Zhao et. al. have used a game theoretic approach to
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solve this problem, with the Nash Equilibrium for bidders determined through a matrix
game [22]. Their simplified model uses two bidders that can bid at three discrete levels.
Auction selections are executed using the BCM and PCM algorithms for each strategy
tuple, and Nash Equilibriums are determined using the matrix game concept. In the case
that no equilibrium is found from the discrete matrix game, approximate equilibriums are
sought in a methodical manner. If any equilibriums are found using this strategy, they
constitute the optimal bidding strategy for the two suppliers in the game.

This method will be implemented in MATLAB and CPLEX to cross-check the results
found from 30-day simulation example case with bid generation provided by EMCAS. It
is expected that the findings of Zhao et. al. will be confirmed for the example case of this
study to support the results of the 30-day simulation case.

Probabilistic bidding model

An alternative bidding model with four generators that maximizes each generator’s
expected profit based on historical data will also be implemented for cross-checking the
results of the 30-day simulation example case.

Inputs for each generator include

historical demand levels and historical bid prices. Each generator has access to the other
generators’ bids from six months before the auction, as well as the historical load levels.

The expected profit for one generator is calculated using the probability distributions of
historical bids of the other three generators, the probability distribution of the load level,
the expected level of power generation dispatched given the other generators’ bids (which
are cycled-through with a step equal to the bid interval specification), and the expected
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payout per megawatt (which would either be equivalent to the MCP if selected or 0 if not
selected). The expected profit given the first generator’s bid can be expressed as

nb

nb

nb

nd

iG 2 iG 3 iG 4

iD

EP= ∑∑∑∑ [Pr(q 12,iG 2 = q 2 ) * Pr( q31,iG 3 = q3 ) * Pr( q 14,iG 4 = q 4 ) * Pr( d iD = D)] * [ P] * [ payout ]
Equation 3: Expected profit function for the first of four generators engaged in a game based on the
proposed probabilistic model of bidding.

1
1
where the qind
,iGind are the predicted generator bids, Pr( qind ,iGind = qind ) , are the probabilities

that the predicted generator bid is equal to the actual generator bid, P is the expected
1
generation level given other generators’ bids qind
,iGind and the first generator’s bid, and

payout is the expected level of payout per megawatt given the same information (the
payout per megawatt being the MCP if P > 0 or 0 if P = 0). This expected profit method
is a function of the bid of the first generator; all other inputs to this method are static user
inputs (including capacities, the historical bid and demand data, and number of intervals
for the demand data, nd, and number of intervals for the historical bid data, nb). The
program implementation cycles through the range of possible bids for the first generator
and determines the bid that will maximize the expected profit depending on the behavior
of the competing generators.

VIII. Numerical Testing Apparatus

The selection methods for BCM and PCM auctions were implemented in CPLEX and
executed on an Intel Xeon E3510 PC at 1.60 GHz with two processors and 8.00 GB of
16

RAM. The EMCAS market simulation model was constructed and run on an Intel Core 2
Duo PC at 2.20 GHz with 2.00 GB of RAM. The same PC was used to implement the
game theoretic bidding model and probabilistic bidding model in MATLAB.

IX. Conclusions
The decreasing supply of fossil fuels is expected to cause an energy crisis of immense
magnitude in the near future. Increased efficiency in electricity markets can relieve some
of this pressure. Implementation of PCM may reduce the price of energy for consumers
and have some effect on the quantity of harmful emissions. This project has attempted to
determine what effect use of the PCM auction selection method has on energy price.
In review, this study was fruitful in showing that implementation of PCM as an auction
selection method may reduce consumer payments in the long term. However, we cannot
draw any strong conclusions at this time and will seek to cross-check simulation results
with alternative methods of bid simulation.

Successful implementation of these

alternative bid simulation methods may support the results found in this study.
Subsequently, more concrete conclusions may be stated with respect to the
efficaciousness of employing the PCM auction selection method in electricity markets.
The discrete game theoretic model presented in section VII can show through
determination of the discrete Nash equilibrium that PCM may minimize total consumer
payments in the long term. The probabilistic model can be used to arrive at the same
result using historical data associated with the generators.
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XII. Appendix
BCM, objective function specification
dvar int Take[providers][time] in 0..1;
dvar float Power[providers][time] in 0..maxDemand;
dvar float MCP[time] in 0..90;
dvar int u[providers][time] in 0..1;
minimize
sum (t in 1..nbHours) (sum (p in providers) suppliers[p][2] * u[p][t]) + // Startup Costs
sum (t in 1..nbHours) (sum (p in providers) suppliers[p][1] * Power[p][t]); // Prices every hour

PCM, objective function specification
dvar int Take[providers][time] in 0..1;
dvar float Power[providers][time] in 0..maxDemand;
dvar float MCP[time] in 0..100;
dvar int u[providers][time] in 0..1;
minimize
sum (t in 1..nbHours) (sum (p in providers) suppliers[p][2] * u[p][t]) + // Startup Costs
sum (t in 1..nbHours) (MCP[t] * demand[t]); // Prices every hour

Constraint Specification for BCM and PCM
subject to {
sum (p in providers) Take[p][0] == 0;
sum (p in providers) Power[p][0] == 0;
forall (t in 1..nbHours)
{
sum (p in providers) Power[p][t] == demand[t];
forall (p in providers) {
MCP[t] >= (suppliers[p][1] * Take[p][t]);
u[p][t] >= 0;
u[p][t] >= (Take[p][t] - Take[p][t-1]);
((Power[p][t] >= suppliers[p][4] && Power[p][t] <= suppliers[p][3]) || Power[p][t] == 0);
((Take[p][t] == 1 && Power[p][t] >= 0.0001) || (Take[p][t] == 0 && Power[p][t] == 0));
}
}
}
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